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Introduction
by Philip Schofield, Professor of the History of Legal and Political Thought,
Head of Department, The Bentham Project, UCL Faculty of Laws
It is an immense pleasure and great honour for me to introduce Professor
Malcolm Quinn. I have known Professor Quinn for nearly 10 years, ever since
he had the temerity to attend one of the Bentham Seminars that we organize
annually at UCL. He explained that he was working on utilitarianism and art,
which to some people may sound like a contradiction in terms, and he
subsequently invited me to speak on ‘Bentham and taste’ at a symposium which
he organized on ‘The Idea of the Art School in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain’
at Tate Britain in 2010. Professor Quinn had come to realize that there was an
important conversation to be had concerning Benthamite utilitarianism and
aesthetics that was not only of historical interest but of contemporary
significance. I then invited Professor Quinn to give a Bentham Seminar, having
become aware that he was opening up what was, for scholars of Bentham and
of the history of utilitarianism more generally, a whole new area of study.
Professor Quinn soon afterwards published his monograph Utilitarianism and
the Art School in Nineteenth-century Britain (2013), which combines his cross-
disciplinary expertise in fine art, intellectual history, and art education. It consists
of a highly original study of the influence of utilitarian thought, and of Bentham
in particular, on the introduction of publicly funded art education in nineteenth-
century Britain. The key events in his account are first, the establishment of the
House of Commons Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures of 1835–6,
which was dominated by followers of Bentham, in particular John Bowring and
William Ewart, and which led to the establishment of the government-funded
School of Design; and second, the reforms introduced by Henry Cole after the
4
School came under his control in 1852. Professor Quinn points out that Bentham
regarded the notion of ‘good taste’ as a device used by the aristocracy or ruling
elite in order to support their power and privileges. Aristocratic good taste found
its institutional embodiment in the Royal Academy of Arts. The School of
Design, therefore, given its Benthamite origins, might have been expected to
provide a clear, utilitarian alternative to the Royal Academy. Professor Quinn
argues, however, that, influenced by the laissez-faire principles associated with
Adam Smith and, therefore, excluding any role for the legislator, Bowring and
Ewart accepted the standards provided by custom and convention in matters of
taste. It was only when Cole came to control the School, that a more radical
agenda was adopted. Questions of taste were subordinated to questions of utility,
legislative involvement encouraged, and some distance placed between the
publicly funded institution and the Royal Academy. Professor Quinn goes on to
argue that Bentham’s radical utilitarian agenda for the art school remains
relevant today as a model for the publicly funded art school. In short, the book
is not only a highly original contribution to Bentham studies, nineteenth-century
intellectual history, and the history of art education, but also announces a
rationale for a programme of reform.
Professor Quinn has since worked on a comparison of the standards of taste
found in David Hume and Bentham, and further developed his ideas about the
nature of taste in a democratic society. As well as the explicit comparison of
Hume and Bentham, Professor Quinn has shed considerable light on their
respective underlying philosophies, and the vexed question as to whether Hume
was or was not a utilitarian, and whether, or rather to what extent, Bentham
was a follower of Hume. By relating his considerable knowledge and
understanding of aesthetics to themes in the history of moral and political theory,
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Professor Quinn is making a contribution to the subject that is being recognized
internationally—at least by Bentham scholars—to be of outstanding importance
and originality.
As an example of the way in which Professor Quinn is playing a critical role in
developing and expanding the range of Bentham studies, I would like to refer to
the current seminar series on ‘Bentham and the Arts’ that, together with
Professor Anthony Julius (UCL Laws), Professor Quinn and I have organized
and which will hopefully lead to a co-edited publication. Speakers have been
asked to consider Bentham’s challenge to aesthetics with a particular focus on
Bentham’s writings on sexual morality, in which he demolishes the traditional
Christian conflation of marriage, sex, and procreation. I am grateful to Professor
Quinn for his support, advice, encouragement, and especially his ideas, which are
making this series so successful. I mention this to show that Professor Quinn is
not only a top-rate scholar, but that he is an excellent colleague, who is
passionate about his subject and who communicates that passion to others. The
present lecture, which develops some of the themes that characterize his recent
work and relates them to a contemporary setting, will constitute the evidence
that will prove the claims that I have made about the quality of Professor Quinn’s
research and scholarship.
Philip Schofield
Bentham Project, University College London
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Figure 1
The first public Art School, 1837 Government School of Design, Somerset House, Illustrated London
News 27th May 1843
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I was delighted and honoured when University of the Arts London gave me the
title of Professor of Cultural and Political History, not least because this offers
the opportunity to do research at the intersection of culture and politics within
the historical framework of state-funded art education on which this University
was founded and within which I was educated. My current research is about
how Jeremy Bentham’s thought can change our view of the familiar story of
British aesthetics since the eighteenth century.i This research sustains a focus on
aesthetics, ethics and politics that I’ve maintained since the publication of my
first book in 1994.ii In the book Utilitarianism and the Art School in Nineteenth-
Century Britain (Routledge 2013), I showed how followers of Jeremy Bentham
in the UK Parliament in the early nineteenth century, who included Bentham’s
editor John Bowring, sought to change attitudes to arts institutions when they
challenged the public value of the Royal Academy of Arts and secured a grant
for the first state-funded art school in England, The Government School of
Design, which was established in 1837 at the very beginning of the Victorian era
(Figure 1) Securing a government grant for art education, which was only the
second British government grant given for education of any kind, was a political
act that was part of a general argument about the transparency and
accountability of public institutions. We have seen an echo of this debate in 2018,
with complaints that works of art borrowed from the Royal Collection, which
are currently on show in an exhibition of the art collection of Charles I at the
Royal Academy of Arts,iii should be “free to be seen by the people, its true
owners.”iv It is also worth noting that although the utilitarians secured the grant
for state-funded art education in 1836, the management of the School of Design
was was not in the hands of anyone who shared their approach until 1852, when
Henry Cole set out on a mission to bring about ‘the art education of the whole
people’. In this lecture, in line with the focus of my current research, I’m going
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9to place the particular historical narrative of state-funded art education in Britain
within a larger narrative of the bourgeois revolution in taste leading from Joseph
Addison to David Hume, as well as indicating how Jeremy Bentham staged his
own counter-revolution against Hume and Addison in the name of democracy.
In placing taste outside democracy, I will argue, Bentham provided us with an
insight into the strange ‘apolitical’ politics of taste, which seeks to bring about
a situation in which the route to a certainty of judgement and common
understanding is only available through the apolitical agency of impartiality.
This position of impartiality, however, is used to enforce a social distinction that
separates the ‘good’ and impartial pleasures of taste from the ‘bad’ and
indiscriminate pleasures of the world at large. Jeremy Bentham was a thinker of
the bourgeois era who saw that if the bourgeoisie sought to solve their ethical
problems by aesthetic means, specifically through the employment of distinctions
between good and bad taste, new ethical problems would be created as a result.
For Bentham, questions of taste and the social role of art should be considered
within the framework of the social organization of pleasure. Since the origins of
the state funded art school form part of the story of the bourgeois revolution in
taste, Bentham’s counter-revolution against Addison and Hume is also part of
that history, and may offer some lessons to those of us working in art and design
education in 2018 who are seeking new ways of talking about taste or good
ways to stop talking about it. The first part of this lecture draws attention to the
manner in which impartial distinctions of taste construct a defile or narrow path
for judgment that can survive the collapse in the cultural value of these
distinctions. A recent example of this was the award of the Nobel Prize in
Literature to Bob Dylan in 2017, which challenged cultural distinctions of the
kind that would separate Bob Dylan from John Keats, but thereby affirmed the
status of the impartial spectator within judgments of cultural value, over and
University of the Arts London Professorial Platform 2018
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above the sectarian interests of literary cliques. The second part of this lecture
suggests that the way out of taste lies through the rejection of the impartiality
through which distinctions of taste are enforced. 
In locating the particular historical narrative of state-funded art education in
Britain within a larger narrative of the bourgeois revolution in taste, the first
thing to say is that state-funded art education is linked to social distinctions of
taste by the manner in which distinctions of taste emerge in the context of the
transition to modern, market-led societies. In an article published in Studio
International in 1970, Norbert Lynton, who at that time was Head of the
Department of Art History at Chelsea School of Art, declared that that “the
existence of any sort of state-funded art education is a very remarkable thing ..
it proves the survival of a superstition that came in with industrialization, a desire
for some sort of insurance policy against the end of civilization.”v There are a
couple of interesting things to note about this statement. The first is that it makes
for good history, because Lynton locates the origins of the state-funded art school
with industrialization and capital rather than within a general history of art or
a simple narrative of art education stretching from the academies of the
Renaissance to 1970. The Government School of Design that opened in rooms
in Somerset House London on 1 June 1837, was distinguished not by the special
qualities of art, but rather by the way that the term ‘design’ was used to frame
an aesthetic response to the logic of commerce and capital. This set The School
of Design apart from both academies of art and traditional universities. In The
School of Design, ‘design’ became the name for an attempt to institute
government regulation of the existing social regulatory force of taste, in the form
of a public pedagogy linking the artisan, the manufacturer and the customer.
Before the establishment of the School of Design, what the aesthetico-social
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regulatory force of distinctions between good and bad taste had already brought
about was, a new challenge to the social status of the connoisseur who trains
himself to recognize the particular qualities of an object of art, by the person of
taste who uses objects of art to train his own perception. As Giorgio Agamben
has pointed out, the increasing social importance of the person of taste in
commercial society “does not correspond, as we might have expected, to the
spirit’s more receptive attitude towards art or even to an increased interest in
art.’vi In Britain, perhaps more than any other country, distinctions of taste
developed to provide aesthetic solutions to the moral problems of commercial
society. Eventually, in 1837, a School of Design whose mission is the government
regulation of public taste, becomes a radically different institution from an
Academy of Art and a university. 
At the same time, however, it is also possible to describe another kind of marginal
history of art that developed as a response to the non-concurrence of art and
taste. In this lecture, I’m going to discuss two artists who have engaged with
taste as a subject for their art. The first artist, William Hogarth, gives us an
insight into how to approach ‘the history of taste’ which is the historical
framework for what I have called the ‘requirement’ for state-sponsored art
school pedagogy in England. Hogarth, who sets out a thesis on public taste in his
print ‘The Bad Taste of the Town’ of 1723/4 (Figure 2), gained personal
advantages from a new emphasis on aesthetic solutions to moral problems in
commercial society in a way that, later in his career, put him at odds with Joshua
Reynolds’ allegiance to an ideal history of art that is enshrined in the mission of
the Royal Academy of Arts. The second artist, Grayson Perry, who is the
Chancellor of UAL, gives us an insight into the problems and opportunities for
an analysis of taste from within the legacy of state-funded art education. Grayson
University of the Arts London Professorial Platform 2018
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Figure 2
William Hogarth, ‘Masquerades and Operas or The Bad Taste of the Town’ 1723
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Perry is a contemporary artist who, I would say, deliberately chooses to work with
the fact that social distinctions of taste, expressed as a set of responses to his objects
that are inscribed on those objects, do not concur with the history of art which he
also uses as a resource. I will focus on his pot ‘Taste and Democracy’ from 2005,
which displays soundbite reactions to Perry’s Turner Prize win in 2003. 
When Grayson Perry delivered the first of four Reith Lectures for the BBC in 2013
with the title ‘Democracy Has Bad Taste’, arts practitioners were given a new kind
of forum in debates on taste. More recently, staff at UAL have hosted the
conference ‘Taste After Bourdieu’vii at Chelsea College of Arts in 2014 and initiated
the exhibition ‘The Vulgar: Fashion Redefined’ at the Barbican in 2017.viii The
‘Taste After Bourdieu’ conference was the starting point for the forthcoming book
The Persistence of Taste: Art, Museums and Everyday Life After Bourdieu, which
I have edited with Dave Beech, Carol Tulloch, Michael Lehnert and Stephen
Wilson (Routledge 2018). The aim of our book is to offer an interdisciplinary
analysis of taste in the wake of Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology of taste. Our book
unites artists and art educators with curators, sociologists, art theorists, art
historians, design historians and cultural historians. Hosting an interdisciplinary
conference on Bourdieu in a University of the Arts raised an important question
regarding the analysis of taste, namely, how do twentieth -century models for the
analysis of taste, which were built on debates in sociology, anthropology and
aesthetic philosophy, hold up in the twenty-first century, at a point when questions
of taste are both widely dismissed as irrelevant and anachronistic and yet are
proving hard to eradicate from public discourse. At present, taste is in the odd
position of being consigned to history by the leaders of cultural institutions while
being acknowledged as an unwelcome but persistent spectre of social value. To
give one example, in an interview in 2017, Deyan Sudjic, co-Director of the Design
Taste and Democracy Malcolm Quinn
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Museum in London, advocated the separation of the activity of design from
judgments of taste as a matter of curatorial policy:
There was an exhibition in the early days of the museum at the Boiler House
[sic], which was called Taste, and Stephen Bailey [sic], the then-director,
thought it would be a good idea to put things he approved of on easels, and
things he didn’t like on dustbins. You can’t run a museum containing only
things you like. Design is not an object or a thing. Design is not taste.ix
Sudjic hopes, I think, that if he can focus our attention on design as a social activity
rather than design as an object or a thing, then the practice of taste, which is based
on the evaluation of our responses to objects, will disappear from the museum.
Nonetheless, the displays in the Design Museum in 2017 have included one
devoted to ‘Choice and Taste’ which has guided visitors to think about the
difference between choices that, on the one hand, “are heavily influenced by
practical considerations, such as how well a product performs a specific function,
or its value for money” and on the other, choices that are “a matter of personal
taste, with users opting for a favoured colour, material or style.” It seems to me that
this display is making a valiant effort to re-describe taste as a personal matter, in
which everyone makes a simple preference for an object because we ‘like’ the
colour or the style. The ghostly figure behind these simple preferences is the person
of taste, the so-called ‘cultured’ or discriminating person who doesn’t simply prefer
one object to another, but instead shows a stubborn preference for their own ability
to evaluate their responses to objects.  If we are looking for the exit from taste, I
think what we have to do is look to why this preference for the ability to evaluate
our responses to objects is so stubborn. As David Hume put it in his essay ‘Of the
Delicacy of Taste and Passion’ of 1742, a person of discrimination and delicate
15
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sentiment “is more happy by what pleases his taste, than by what gratifies his
appetites, and receives more enjoyment from a poem, or a piece of reasoning, than
the most expensive luxury can afford.”x Here Hume also draws our attention to the
importance of a basic aesthetic distinction between ‘what pleases our taste’ and ‘what
gratifies our appetites’, in other words a distinction between the pleasures of taste and
the pleasures of the world. Hume tells us that the the practice of taste is what can
give us power over our preferences, and that without it we will very quickly start
making bad choices in life. This is the real ‘bourgeois revolution’ in taste, the point
at which the fixed social hierarchies occupied by the aristocracy and the poor are
replaced by an aestheticized form of social mobility in which the evaluation of our
responses to objects is accorded higher status than the ownership of them. To my
mind, this bourgeois revolution in taste is what is left out of Pierre Bourdieu’s
sociological analysis of taste. For Bourdieu, taste is a set of cultural hierarchies that
delimit the characteristics and possibilities of consumption. In Bourdieu’s view,
distinctions of taste appear because the ‘grand bourgeois’ consumes differently from
the university teacher, who consumes differently from the nurse and the executive.
For Hume, on the other hand, taste, which is the business of those in the middle-
station of life, offers the possibility of a social power which is enacted through
ordinary consumption, but in which social status accrues to a cultural and aesthetic
distinction between the pleasures of taste and the pleasures of the world.  Hume
argues that as we wander through the world of goods, we can't pretend that our
happiness does not depend in some way on the objects that surround us. We are not
monks in a monastery or gurus on a mountain in Tibet. On the other hand, we don't
want our happiness to depend on these objects. So how do we walk this tightrope?
Hume’s answer is that we signal that we are not dependent on these objects by
making our choice of some objects rather than others say something good about us.
In this way, taste and discrimination makes us the guarantors of our own happiness. 
Taste and Democracy Malcolm Quinn
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Hume’s view that the pleasures of taste provide us with personal autonomy and
social orientation gives us some insight into why we might still want to exhibit a
stubborn preference for the pleasures of taste over and above the pleasures of the
world. However, I think we have to look elsewhere in Hume for the narrow defile
of taste that nonetheless guarantees an ethical movement across social space. In his
A Treatise on Human Nature, Hume offers the observation that if I hate my enemy
but nonetheless take pleasure in the fine qualities of his voice, this impartial
reflection on the relationship between my satisfaction in his voice and my
dissatisfaction with him as a person ought to make me more certain about
everyone else’s agreement on the qualities of a good voice. This method of
evaluation, Hume argues, is quite different from the careless use of ‘the language
of taste,’ which is stuffed with grand but empty terms such as and ‘elegance’ and
‘simplicity’ that are supposed to compel the agreement of others. If I can make the
transition from the careless use of a language of taste to the careful use of a practice
of taste, then the pleasure I take in my enemy’s singing voice becomes information
that I can use to produce a social orientation for myself, as the kind of person who
is capable of testing out a range of pleasant and unpleasant sensations in order to
arrive at a discriminating judgment. 
This question of an impartial judgment brings us closer to where distinctions of
taste begin to take on meaning in the social field. This is also where the question of
‘taste and democracy’ arises, a question that, as we have seen, also concerns
Grayson Perry. By enforcing a social practice of impartiality, distinctions of taste
don’t so much provide an aesthetic of politics as aestheticise a social ideal of the
apolitical, in which the route to certainty and a community of understanding is
only available through impartiality. But as we have seen, impartiality also enforces
a social distinction that separates the pleasures of taste from the pleasures of the
17
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world. In the second part of this lecture, I’m going to focus on this question of
impartiality and the apolitical in a discussion of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele’s
role in laying the tracks for the bourgeois revolution in The Spectator between 1711
and 1714. Addison’s wish to develop of the arts in conformity with what he called
“the general Sense and Taste of mankind” is also a means to institute a social
hierarchy in which the ‘apolitical’ pleasures of taste, as an idealized vision of social
agency, are valued over and above both political factionalism and the sectarian
character of the arts. Following this discussion, I will show how William Hogarth,
who has been described as an ‘Addisonian’ artist, constructed a first sketch of the
bourgeois revolution in taste and how Grayson Perry has worked with the legacy
of that revolution in his piece ‘Taste And Democracy’. I will then briefly introduce
Jeremy Bentham’s criticism of Addison and his contrasting regard for Hogarth. If
Hogarth’s reading of Addison gives us a relationship between art and taste that
enforces a distinction between the disciplined pleasures of taste and the
undisciplined pleasures of the world, the manner in which Bentham understands the
ethics of Hogarth and Addison in completely distinct ways, suggests that a moral
order of art could achieve independence from the moral order of taste. Bentham
shows us where an exit from taste might be located, in a way that can help us
distinguish a collapse in the cultural value of distinctions of taste from the
impartiality through which these distinctions are enforced. 
Addison and Co.
It is important to note that we can locate the historical origins of distinctions
between good and bad taste; as Penny Sparke has noted, ‘taste’ is only joined by
the epithets ‘good’ or ‘bad’ during the bourgeois revolution xi. This is also the
period, from the early eighteenth century onwards, when this issue of the non-
concurrence of the history of taste with the history of art comes to the fore. This is
Taste and Democracy Malcolm Quinn
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characterised by a wish to develop of the arts in conformity with what Joseph
Addison, in essays for The Spectator between 1711 and 1714, called “the general
Sense and Taste of mankind”. What is distinctive about Addison’s position is that,
one the one hand, it unites all mankind on the ground of ordinary perception and,
on the other hand, it divides mankind into those who can learn to rely on the
pleasures of taste and those who are content with the pleasures of the world. It also
gives a very specific social role to the arts. For Addison, his new conception of taste
‘in general’ could be used to oppose sectarian rules of art; in his words:
Musick, Architecture, and Painting, as well as Poetry, and Oratory, are to
deduce their Laws and Rules from the general Sense and Taste of Mankind,
and not from the Principles of those Arts themselves; or, in other Words, the
Taste is not to conform to the Art, but the Art to the Taste.xii 
In the seventeenth century, writers like Jean de La Bruyère gave some latitude to
the spectator to decide (rightly or wrongly) at what point an object of art has
attained perfection. In The Spectator in the early eighteenth century, Joseph
Addison and his collaborator Richard Steele took another leap forward and used
the eidolon of ‘Mr Spectator’ as the personification of “the general Sense and
Taste of mankind”. The “general Sense and Taste of mankind”, rather than
employing the violence of party political difference, employed violence in a
different way, by seeking to enforce neutrality and impartiality of vision as a
founding principle of cultural agency. Addison even provided a manifesto for this
apolitical party of the “general Sense and Taste of mankind”: 
We whose Names are hereunto subscribed do solemnly declare, That we do
in our Consciences believe two and two make four; and that we shall adjudge
19
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any Man whatsoever to be our Enemy who endeavours to persuade us to the
contrary. We are likewise ready to maintain, with the Hazard of all that is
near and dear to us, That six is less than seven in all Times and all Places, and
that ten will not be more three Years hence than it is at present. We do also
firmly declare, That it is our Resolution as long as we live to call Black black,
and White white. And we shall upon all Occasions oppose such Persons that
upon any Day of the Year shall call Black white, or White black, with the
utmost Peril of our Lives and Fortunes.xiii 
Good taste would triumph, Addison thought, if public taste stopped bowing to
the arbitrary rules of art, and art started accommodating itself to the rationale
that enables everyone to call “Black black, and White white.” This sets up an
opposition between a ‘true’ perception of things as they really are and a false
perception brought about by a fixation on the rules of art. It also means that
true perception becomes a new means to establish social standards of taste.
Despite Addison’s seemingly populist emphasis on ordinary perception, what he
advocated was the replacement of an older social distinction between those who
knew the rules of art and those who did not, with a new distinction. This new
social distinction was between the cultural choices of those who were actively
sharpening their ordinary perception and learning how to evaluate their
responses to the arts, and those who were passively content with all that was
‘childish and absurd’ in the performing arts. Distinctions between Good Taste
and Bad Taste set their own aesthetic rules, which therefore give a specific social
role to the arts, as the vehicles of a refined sensibility. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
has left an account of how taste literally ‘crowds out’ art, when he described the
reaction of the spectators at a play by Molière: “I never attend a presentation of
a Comedy of Molière without admiring the delicacy of the spectators. A word
Taste and Democracy Malcolm Quinn
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that is a little loose, an expression that is coarse rather than obscene, everything
wounds their chaste ears”xiv. Here the spectators run the show, because the
‘coarseness’ of Molière is defined not by the playwright himself but by the
judgment of his audience that he has failed to make his work agreeable to them. 
A different and contemporary perspective on the relationship of taste and art is
provided in an excellent analysis of two museum visitors in front of a painting
by the sociologist Dirk Vom Lehn, in our forthcoming book The Persistence of
Taste: Art, Museums and Everyday Life After Bourdieu. Vom Lehn’s chapter on
these two museum visitors appears in a section of the book on taste and the
museum edited by Michael Lehnert. Vom Lehn offers a close analysis of the
dialogue of two people in front of Rembrandt’s painting of Hendrickje Stoffels.
What is noticeable about his analysis, is how the assessments of the painting that
these two people are standing in front of are being used by them to establish a
social relationship with each other. On the one hand the museum offers a safe
space in which the pleasures of taste, which are based on the evaluation of our
responses to objects, can be separated from the less discriminating pleasures of
the outside world. On the other hand, what is evident in Vom Lehn’s account is
that the evaluation of responses to the Rembrandt portrait, which at one point
veers off into a discussion of The Girl With the Pearl Earring, a film about
Vermeer, can take place in the space of “the general Sense and Taste of mankind”
without having to be concerned with any work of art in particular. 
The status of the museum as a place where the pleasures of taste are pursued,
does not diminish the potential for those outside the museum to enforce
distinctions between the pleasures of taste and the pleasures of the world.  For
an example of this, I’d like to refer you to the following question: “How much
21
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can we really rely on someone who loved The Doors?” This question appeared
in a review by Patricia Lockwood, published in January 2018, of a documentary
film about the writer Joan Didion, directed by her nephew Griffin Dunnexv. It is
a question which takes us straight to the heart of distinctions between good taste
and bad taste, which parse the quality and social status of our responses to
objects. With this question, Lockwood raises an issue concerning Joan Didion’s
ability to evaluate her own responses, which it seems may have been impaired by
her indiscriminate love of The Doors. The question then is “can we really rely”
on someone who is blinded by their passions and can’t tell the difference between
loving something and evaluating it? If Joan Didion can’t organize her own
preferences, what does that say about us if we express a preference for the work
of Joan Didion? In Patricia Lockwood’s review, this spiral of cultural doubt and
suspicion, what she calls the three-in-the-morning question, is laid to rest –
Lockwood decides at the end of her review that Joan Didion’s writing “can be
leaned against like John Wayne.” On the basis of what we have already read, we
have to assume that this certainty about Didion’s quality does not issue from
Lockwood’s love of Joan Didion but rather from her critical evaluation of her
work. Discovering reasons why Didion might not be relied upon, where she
might have been led astray, is what demonstrates the crucial social distinction
between evaluating something and loving it. Addison’s eidolon ‘Mr Spectator’ is
still at work here, because impartiality is what you ought to strive for and the
seductive qualities of the object are what you should resist. This means that after
all this pan-American and cross-cultural shenanigans with Joan Didion, Jim
Morrison and John Wayne we can nonetheless say that we have been offered a
judgment of taste, which could be phrased as ‘Reading Joan Didion is for those
who can learn to prioritise the pleasures of taste, while listening to The Doors is
for those who are content with the simple pleasures of the world.’ A judgment
Taste and Democracy Malcolm Quinn
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that advises us to choose Joan Didion and avoid Jim Morrison is of course
perfectly useless; but it has nonetheless shown us how to find aesthetic support
for the social and ethical value of an impartial judgment, which can protect us
from bad choices. It is important to note the gulf that separates this essentially
bourgeois judgment of taste, which draws on the valorisation of an ethically
safeguarded motion across social space, from an aristocratic take on personal
choice. For an example of the latter, look to the famous and acerbic comment
about Michael Heseltine, attributed to Sir Michael Jopling, that the trouble with
Heseltine was that he had to buy his own furniture. This is a joke made by a
Peer of the Realm at the expense of the socially mobile. 
William Hogarth and Grayson Perry
“It seems beyond argument that Hogarth’s enterprise was Addisonian, in that his
moral series implicitly advocate a middle way between vice and excessive
virtue.”xvi So says David Bindman in his book Hogarth and His Times: Serious
Comedy. Other Hogarth scholars such as Ronald Paulson and David Solkin have
given support to this idea of Hogarth as an Addisonian artist. Mr Spectator
actually makes an appearance in one of Hogarth’s paintings, ‘The Edwards
Hamilton Family’ of 1834 (Figure 3 and Figure 4). At the request of his patron
Mary Edwards, Hogarth painted her holding The Spectator number 580 of
August 1, 1714 in which Addison discusses the omnipresence of the deity. The
Spectator no.22 of March 26 1711, which condemns ‘the false Taste the Town’
may have been one of the sources for Hogarth’s early print ‘The Bad Taste of the
Town’ of 1723.  This print features an imaginary ‘Accademy of Art’ [sic] which
is modelled on Burlington House Piccadilly, the home of Richard Boyle, third
earl of Burlington.  This fantasy academy, whose doors are firmly shut, is shown
to be failing to stem the general decay of public taste that is illustrated in the
23
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foreground, in the form of crowds being led towards the facile and shallow
amusements of masquerades and Italian operas. In the middle of the image, plays
written by English dramatists such as Shakespeare, Congreve, Dryden and – who
else – Addison, are being carted off in a wheelbarrow to be sold as wastepaper.
Here Hogarth stays true to Addison’s injunction that “Taste is not to conform
to the Art, but the Art to the Taste” and the viewpoint of ‘Mr Spectator’ that
separates the true pleasures of impartial vision from the false pleasures of the
world.  
Grayson Perry, I think, does not show us how to find aesthetic support for the
social and ethical value of an impartial judgment, but rather shows how such
impartial judgments split the social field and divide the artist from his audience,
rather than establishing an Addisonian community of common sense that artists
are happy to conform to. ‘Taste and Democracy’, a glazed ceramic pot made by
Grayson Perry in 2004 (Figure 5), depicts characters with speech bubbles who
offer soundbite reactions to Perry’s Turner Prize win in 2003, including, for
example, one bubble with the words ‘He’s a serious artist and a lovable
character’ spoken by a woman pushing a pram.  The source of this statement was
actually a question put to Perry from a journalist following the Turner Prize win.
In this case, public discourse has been trapped like a genie in a glazed ceramic
pot. Any response to Perry’s pot would inevitably include a response to these
stylized responses and so would make you wonder how stylized your own
response is going to be, as if you would always find a version of your daring
critical challenge already inscribed on its surface. 
These two artworks on the subject of taste show that it is also possible to
describe what happens when artists respond to ‘Mr Spectator’s’ intentions for art,
or in the case of Grayson Perry, to the legacy of that response. However, as I will
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Figure 3
The Edwards Hamilton Family on a Terrace, 1734,
William Hogarth, Oil on canvas, 68.5 x 86 cm.
Private Collection Photograph by Patrick Goetelen
Figure 4
Detail
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now discuss, Jeremy Bentham’s paradoxical embrace of Hogarth on anti-
Addisonian principles accomplishes another kind of work by indicating the exit
from distinctions of taste. 
Jeremy Bentham
Jeremy Bentham loathed Joseph Addison and liked William Hogarth. He
displayed Hogarth’s illustrations to Samuel Butler’s Hudibras on the walls of his
house. We can account for this anomaly if we observe that in Bentham’s
discussion of Hogarth’s engravings depicting the benefits of ‘Beer Street’ and the
evils of ‘Gin Lane’ (Figure 6), he identifies Hogarth as someone who had
“reflected more upon morals than many who give themselves out as professors
of this science.”xvii Reflecting on morals in a way that puts you on a par with
professors of moral philosophy is not the same thing as solving your ethical
problems by aesthetic means, through the employment of distinctions between
good and bad taste. Bentham’s view of Hogarth does not assume that the moral
order of art, which can present an ethical choice between the good option of
‘Beer Street’ and the bad option of ‘Gin Lane’, is necessarily subsumed within the
impartial moral order established by the pleasures of taste. It is important to
note that Bentham’s attack on Addison takes place on the terms set by an
Addisonian worldview, in which the arts have been co-opted to a project of
refinement; but his comments on Hogarth shows how a counter-revolution is
possible from within the terms of this Addisonian universe. To adapt terms that
I used earlier, if Patricia Lockwood’s problem is “How much can we really rely
on someone who loved The Doors?” the problem that Bentham poses is, to use
his own words, how can we choose “A pure and simple amusement?” when
“to be hard to please .. shall be found to be advantageous?”xviii Lockwood’s
question, as I have said, is about how to find aesthetic and ethical justifications
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to support the social value of an impartial judgment, which can protect us from
bad choices in music and many other things as well. Bentham’s question, in
contrast, is about why we tend to assume that certain choices are generally
inferior, when we gain a particular social advantage by avoiding them. Jeremy
Bentham has to find his way out of the world built by distinctions of good taste
and bad taste by reversing the logic through which this world has been built.
The logic of Addisonian taste is that impartiality is the guarantee of a good
choice. From Bentham’s point of view, impartiality, which separates the
pleasures of taste from the pleasures of the world, is a way of turning what had
previously been a source of pleasure and amusement for oneself or for someone
else into an object of ridicule and contempt. He reasoned that good taste, rather
than guaranteeing virtue or constructing an insurance policy against the end of
civilization, was a source of social harm. By working against the grain of the
logic of what I have called the strange ‘apolitical’ politics of taste, Bentham
came to the conclusion that taste and democracy were at odds with each other.
His thought suggests that we can reject the aristocratic violence involved in
pointing out that someone has bought their own furniture, without having to
then embrace the bourgeois violence of asking whether we can rely on someone
who loved The Doors.
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Conclusion 
In the first part of this lecture, I drew attention to the manner in which judgments
of taste can be completely useless a guide to what to choose and what to reject
within the cultural field, while still convincing us that impartiality will protect us
from bad choices. The second part of this lecture suggested that the way out of
taste lies through the rejection of the impartial evaluation of our responses to
objects through which distinctions of taste are enforced. Impartiality itself may be
a bad choice – that stubborn preference for our ability to evaluate our responses
to objects, may itself be the thing that is leading us astray. In conclusion, I want
to tell a story about an art school (not UAL) that illustrates how good taste can
be a bad choice. In the designer Victor Papanek’s polemic Design For the Real
World, he discusses a low-tech radio receiver that used a recycled tin can,
transistor, earplug, wire paraffin wax and wick, designed by Papanek and George
Seeger to be used in parts of the world without a good power supply and using
locally sourced materials. Papanek observed that when he discussed the design for
the radio in a lecture at the Hochschule für Gestaltung in Ulm Germany in 1966,
the Professors of the School strongly objected and suggested that he should paint
his can light grey on the grounds of taste. Papanek replied:
painting it would have been wrong. For one thing, it would have raised the
price of each unit by maybe one twentieth of a penny each, which is a great
deal of money when millions of radios are built. Secondly, and much more
importantly, I feel that I have no right to make aesthetic or “good taste”
decisions that will affect millions of people in Indonesia, who are members of
a different culture.xix
What could be more ‘impartial’ than a coat of light grey paint? What could
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exemplify the dangers of bad choices, shallow amusement and kitsch more than
a gaudily decorated can? Yet Papanek, shows, firstly, how impartiality is enforced
as a way of preventing bad choices and, secondly, why impartiality itself is
exactly the wrong choice in this situation. This story also asks us to reflect in
what ways people who work in art schools become conscious of how decisions
that are apparently made in the name of good art and good design, are actually
being made in the name of apolitical socio-cultural forces and insurance policies
against the end of civilization. The conditions that created a requirement for the
state-supported art school of the 1830s no longer exist, yet, writers such as
Michael Bhaskar have argued that “We now have so much – whether it’s books,
songs, films or artworks (let alone data) – that we can’t manage it all alone. We
need an “algorithmic culture”. Yet we also need something more than ever:
human taste.”xx Bhaskar assumes that ‘Mr Spectator’, the person of taste, is still
the privileged agent of culture, the still point around which everything else
revolves. But this is not necessarily the case. In the Addisonian universe, good
cultural choices are the prophylactic against bad cultural choices. In the current
universe of consumption, products can design themselves and refine their
operability from user data. A pathological user who exhibits social regressive
tendencies may well be preferred, as the economic value of their data could be
greater. Rather than Bhaskar’s idea of a mutually beneficial trade-off between the
tastemaker and the algorithm, in future we are likely to see an increasing
asymmetry between human decisions and corporate control of the design object,
which in turn will generate the need for new design interventions in the field of
human decision making to plug the gaps. In this way, a relationship between
good human choices and bad human choices that is controlled by distinctions of
taste will become less and less relevant. In a reversal of Joseph Addison’s appeal
to “the general Sense and Taste of Mankind”, the general management of
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Figure 6
William Hogarth, ‘Beer Street’ and ‘Gin Lane’ 1751
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pathology may become the cultural norm and self-management through taste
the cultural exception. As a harbinger of this, at the end of my introduction to
The Persistence of Taste, I make the following observation ‘In 2013, at a meeting
of a UK Parliamentary Group on Culture and Wellbeing, someone raised the
possibility that membership of the National Trust might be a better solution for
depression than antidepressants. If culture is prescribed, it cannot be chosen. If
it cannot be chosen, there can be no taste.’ What this also means, of course, is
that there can be no social distinction between the pleasures of taste and the
pleasures of the world. Then you can listen to The Doors without someone else
losing their trust in you. 
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